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Abstract
Early in 2001, after a damning public report by the Auditor-General, the Australian Federal
Government was forced to abandon its highly promoted “whole of government” infrastructure
outsourcing initiative. This about-face was greeted in the press with reports that the initiative
was a ‘fiasco’. Yet a four-year case study of the initiative suggests a more complex picture.
The initiative can be viewed in a quite different light on the basis of comparisons with a
contemporary survey of 240 Australian organisations engaged in IT outsourcing. This
reveals that many of the negative outcomes associated with this ‘fiasco’ are typical of those
experienced by large Australian organisations. This has important implications for decision
makers confronted with choices about sourcing IT service delivery.
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INTRODUCTION
On 24 July 2001 an article appeared in the influential IT pages of The Australian claiming
that as a result of the “Federal Government IT outsourcing fiasco” many public and private
sector organisations were rethinking their attitudes to IT outsourcing. The article stated that
“concerns about the handling of federal outsourcing had turned private industry off the whole
concept” (Mitchell, 2001a:31). This article highlights the controversy surrounding the Federal
Government’s outsourcing of its IT infrastructure. Six weeks later, the issue again hit the
headlines in The Australian with a report that the 2000 Senate Finance and Public
Administration References Committee had found the initiative was seriously flawed (Mitchell,
2001b:41). Between 1998 and 2001 the initiative was rarely out of the headlines for long.
This paper reports a four year study of the Federal government whole-of-government IT
infrastructure outsourcing initiative, The paper provides a brief outline of the case; reports
the data sources used; considers several key observations that can be made about the
case, and presents several implications these have for decision makers.

CASE SYNOPSIS
In April 1997, the Federal Australian Government announced that by 1999 it intended to
outsource the delivery of IT infrastructure (mainframe, server, and desktop services, and in
some cases telecommunications) for most federal agencies. This initiative would lead to
saving of up to A$1 billion, boost local industry development, and provide access to new
technologies. Savings were to occur through the use of external vendors, and the
consolidation of requirements across government agencies, which would, in some cases, be
clustered to form cross-agency contracts. The decision created some controversy, and was
examined by an ongoing Senate Inquiry (SFPARC, 1997). Expecting some internal
resistance to the initiative, and anxious that projected cost reductions not be dissipated, in
the 1997 budget Government deducted from line budgets the 15% savings expected to
accrue from outsourcing IT.
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In 1999, the Federal Auditor-General independently decided to review the outcomes of the
first four contracts under this initiative. His September 2000 Report (ANAO, 2000) found that
the ambitious timetable established by the Federal Government had not been met, and that
the costs of market testing and contracting had blown out substantially (by over $AUD26
million). Most of these cost blow-outs were related to the costs of specialist international
consultants, including ‘Big 5” accounting firms, outsourcing advisors, and the outsourcing
legal specialists, Shaw Pittman. These advisors were engaged to facilitate the
implementation of the initiative. The Auditor-General also found that, contrary to Government
claims, only one of the first four contracts, the contract for “Cluster 3”, was likely to deliver
any substantial savings, and that actual savings after twelve months were less than half of
those projected at the time the contract was signed. At the same time the Auditor-General
found that outsourcing had a number of negative consequences on the operational business
of agencies.
The Auditor-General’s Report re-ignited community opposition to the initiative, and led the
Government, late in 2000, to commission an independent inquiry to examine the risks
associated with the initiative (the Humphry Inquiry). In January 2001 the Federal
Government released the Humphry Report (Humphry, 2000), which recommended that the
centralised and consolidated approach to IT outsourcing be discontinued. However, agency
line managers would still be required to evaluate the outsourcing of their IT infrastructure
services and justify their decision if they chose not to outsource. The Humphry Report did
not address the issue of cost savings, but instead found that the risks associated with the
consolidated approach were higher than had been expected, particularly implementation
risks, or the risk to the agencies’ operations.
The first four contracts for the initiative, those reviewed by the Auditor-General, are listed
below:
Won by

Date

‘Cluster 3’ – DIMA*, AEC* and four small agencies

Agency

Value
$160m

CSC

Mar-98

Department of Employment, Training and Youth Affairs and
Employment National (DEETYA-EN)

$300m

Cancelled

Jun-98

Australian Tax Office (ATO)

$490m

IBM/GSA

Jun-99

$90m

Advantra

Jul-99

‘Group 5’ – five small agencies

*DIMA: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, AEC: Australian Electoral Commission

Table 1: Agencies analysed by the Auditor-General’s Whole Of Government IT Infrastructure
Outsourcing Initiative Review (ANAO, 2000)
Contrary to suggestions made elsewhere (e.g. Seddon, 2001; Willcocks’ submission to
SFPARC, 2001), although relatively large in scope, the whole of government outsourcing
initiative was not an example of “total outsourcing”. Instead, involving only infrastructure IT
services and accounting for around half of IT expenditure (SFPARC, 1997; 2001), the
initiative was an example of “selective outsourcing”. Thus the case provides interesting
insights into the failure of a strategy that has been described by Lacity and Willcocks
(2001:6) as generally likely to succeed.

METHODOLOGY
This case study was analysed using hermeneutic textual analysis. Hermeneutic analysis is a
process used to identify contextual explanations for apparent contradictions found in
qualitative text-based data. The textual material is repeatedly sifted and compared to find
cross-verification and contradictions. Understanding emerges from the comparison between
new and previous information. The strategy is akin to the work of a historian sifting through
competing accounts of past events and motivations. Text sources used by the authors
included:
•
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Notes from interviews conducted between 1997 and 2001 with 16 informants
working for 9 Federal agencies, or for their IT service vendors. In most cases,
informants were interviewed more than once;
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•

A literature review based on press reports related to Australian IT outsourcing
between 1997 and May 2001;

•

Detailed analysis of a number of Federal and State government reports,
particularly the 1997, 1998 and 2000 Senate Finance and Public Administration
References Committee Inquiries into outsourcing initiatives (SFPARC 1997;
2001), the Auditor-General’s Report (ANAO, 2000); and the Humphry Report
(cited as Humphry, 2001);

•

Walker and Walker’s (2000) broad based analysis of government outsourcing in
Australia;

•

A study of the case by Seddon (2001) that is drawn from the Auditor-General’s
and Humphry Reports;

•

Analyses prepared for members of parliament by the Parliamentary Library
Politics and Public Administration Group (Verspaandonk 2001a; 2001b);

•

Notes from a series of focus groups involving 56 respondents reporting on their
experiences of IT outsourcing; and

•

Re-analysis of a University of Melbourne IT outsourcing survey of 1000 large
sites in Australia distributed in 2000 (Rouse, 2002). This survey was conducted
by a team of five that included Rouse, Seddon, and Willcocks (an initial report is
found in Seddon et al., 2000).

KEY FINDINGS
The authors’ research into the case revealed several key findings (discussed below) that
provide a lens through which the case can be interpreted.
The 15% savings target
Although the initiative encountered problems in a number of areas, it is unlikely that it would
have been abandoned if it had met its key goal: to provide savings of 15%. These savings
expectations arose on the basis of expert advice received from vendors, industry specialists,
consultants and academics.
At the time vendor bids were assessed, detailed costings were carried out by the agency
tasked with managing the initiative (the Office of Government IT, or OGIT) under the
guidance of specialist consultants, and in consultation with agency management and IT
staff. These bids in turn were sought only after extensive research had been undertaken of
the services likely to be required, and the costs of internal service delivery. Analysis at the
time vendors were selected suggested savings of up to 28% were likely, and a target of 15%
would have appeared achievable. However, the Auditor-General’s analysis (ANAO, 2000)
revealed that despite relying on world-class consulting advice, the cost and savings
projections for two of the arrangements (ATO and Group 5) were flawed. Decision makers
had failed to take into account additional cash streams associated with equipment that would
be available at the end of the contract if the services were not outsourced. They had also
under-estimated the costs of leasing risks absorbed by the agencies.
As a result, the Auditor-General determined that only Cluster 3 was likely to make any
substantial savings from the outsourcing arrangements. However, based on the information
available when the vendor was selected, his projected savings for that group were 28%,
while the actual savings at the end of the first 12 months of the contract were only 12% 
not enough to reach the apparently conservative 15% target. Five per cent of this
discrepancy was accounted for by unexpectedly high initial redeployment costs, but there
was still a substantial gap between the projected 23% savings and the actual 12% achieved.
Because actual savings had not reached the target and were so much lower than projected
savings, this result was seen in a negative light. The Auditor-General found that the Cluster
3 agencies were required to make up the 3% shortfall out of operating budget and that this
had negative effects on their operational performance. However, examination of the
literature on IT outsourcing savings, as well as discussions with 56 IT practitioners (Rouse,
2002) suggests that savings of 12% are at the high end of what can be realistically expected
from outsourcing IT services. Even savings of this level are only rarely achieved.
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A contemporary survey of IT outsourcers conducted by the University of Melbourne in late
1999/early 2000 revealed a quite different picture to that expected by government decisionmakers, but one which confirmed the information coming from the focus groups. In that
study (240 responses from a sample of 1000 of the top 1600 sites in the country) only a
minority of selective outsourcing cases (42.4%) reported any savings at all, and only 8.7%
reported “substantial” savings. These ratios were statistically no different to those for the
sample as a whole  42.1% and 7.4% respectively (Rouse, 2002). The majority of
organisations responding to the survey failed to report even moderate savings from
outsourcing, whether they were government or non-government organisations, medium,
large or very large organisations, and whatever proportions of their IT budget was
outsourced (Rouse, 2002). In light of this information, the experiences of the Federal
initiative can be seen as typical, rather than aberrant.
Other, smaller contemporary surveys  such as the two reported by Lacity and Willcocks,
(2000; 2001) with a total of 77 outsourcing respondents, and that by Aubert et al., 2000, with
70 respondents  also confirmed that IT outsourcing did not result in substantial savings.
On the other hand, it frequently led to cost increases (in up to 49% of cases according to
Aubert et al., (1999) and 22% in Seddon (2002)).
Decision makers went to some trouble to follow recommended practices
It has been suggested in the press and academic literature that the initiative represents a
failure by decision-makers to follow recommended practice. Seddon (2001), for example,
juxtaposes an account of the initiative with what he labels “ten commandments” for good
practice, implying by doing so that these prescriptions were not followed. Most of these
prescriptions are based on a range of practices described as “proven” to lead to outsourcing
success by Lacity and Willcocks in their most recent text (2001:6-16). These practices were
largely articulated in the mid 90s, after Lacity’s and Hirschheim’s (1993; 1995) series of case
studies. They had observed that many organisations that experienced substantial problems
with outsourcing engaged in what could be described as naive behaviour, such as failing to
carry out thorough investigations of their own and market costs; and signing long contracts
(10+ years) with a single vendor for substantial proportions of their IT budget, so increasing
dependence on the vendor. As a result of these case studies Lacity and Hirschheim
developed a set of prescriptions for good sourcing practices. These were further codified
and augmented by Lacity and Willcocks on the basis of a post hoc examination of 61 case
studies one or other author had conducted in Europe and the US (described in Lacity and
Willcocks, 1998; 2001).
The authors’ investigation of the federal initiative suggests that “not following recommended
practices” is an inadequate explanation for the failure. The fact that the government spent
over $25 million on obtaining and implementing specialist consultant advice related to the
design and implementation of the program (ANAO, 2000:17) indicates that decision-makers
were keen to make the arrangement work well. Government had also received advice from
the IT Review Group (ITRG); the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee, panels of industry
specialists, and from the Australian Industries Commission. All of this advice suggested that
if the process was carefully managed, the Government could succeed in achieving the
targeted 15% savings (and possibly much more) without compromising the operational
effectiveness. This message is, incidentally, prevalent in current MIS textbooks.
The evidence gathered by the authors is that the Federal Government spent considerable
effort in planning for, and implementing the initiative, even though, in hindsight, the costs
and time involved were greater than had been expected. In this respect they were typical of
other Australian organisations (Seddon et al., 2000). The case study data gathered by the
authors suggests that decision-makers followed almost all of the “proven practices” from the
literature. Of Seddon’s “ten commandments” for IT outsourcing success, there is evidence
that only one was not followed. This practice relates to allowing the internal IT services
groups to bid against external vendors. Informants suggested this was an expensive and
impractical proposition.
To manage risks, government decision-makers adopted practices recommended by Lacity,
Hirschheim and Willcocks, and summarised in Lacity and Willcocks (2001). These included:
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•

Selective outsourcing (at around 50% of IT budget);

•

Targeting services thought likely to be generic and “non core”, i.e. infrastructure
services which Lacity and Willcocks (2001:9) and Seddon et al. (2000:4) have
suggested are frequently outsourced successfully;

•

Use of short contracts (3 to 5 years);

•

Crafting of detailed and comprehensive contracts that were prepared with the
advice of specialists;

•

Retaining highly-skilled specialist staff to manage the arrangement;

•

Involving both line and IT management in the decision, even though, in the end,
senior management (i.e. Cabinet) made the decision;

•

Conducting detailed and extensive analysis of vendor offerings and both internal
and market prices; and

•

Designing and implementing post-contract management structures and
processes. Regular formal and informal monitoring and SLA negotiations were
instituted as part of this process.
Looking at the management attention and resources devoted to the initiative, the case
appears to be a textbook example of decision-makers responding to the best available
advice. This observations raises a critical question: “How likely is it that organisations that do
implement good management practices will “succeed” in IT outsourcing?”.
Research which influenced the decision did not necessarily support the decision
Examination of the Industry Assistance Commission’s report into contracting out, the Senate
Inquiries and the citations used in discussion papers (e.g. Verspaandonk, 2000b) indicates
that Government’s expectation, that 15% savings were realisable from IT outsourcing, were
influenced by several key studies. Particularly important were findings by Domberger,
Hodge, and Lacity and Willcocks. This research was cited by informants, and in public
documents, as evidence that carefully-managed outsourcing frequently leads to substantial
cost savings of 20% to 30% or more. However, closer analysis of this work reveals that a
more complex relationship exists.
For example, research by Domberger (CTC, 1999) suggested savings of 30%+ from
outsourcing were common, and this research played an important role in setting
Government expectations (Rouse, 2002; Walker and Walker, 2000). Walker and Walker
(2000) identify several flaws in some of this research, and careful examination of the most
recent data (CTC, 1999) reveals that while such savings were common for simple
outsourced services such as cleaning and catering, increases of around 8% were observed
when IT services were outsourced.
Hodge (1996) carried out a meta-analysis of a large number of quantitative studies of
general outsourcing by government agencies. His studies translated results from earlier
studies to a common metric, so that data could be consolidated and re-analysed. He found
savings of between 8% and 14% were possible but these were largely for simple services,
like garbage collection, or cleaning (Hodge, 1996). However, savings for corporate services
(which would include IT) increased on average by 5% (Hodge, 1999).
In relation to IT services, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) reported cross case comparisons that
suggested most outsourcing (70%+ of the 33 outsourcing cases with discernible outcomes)
led to savings. They found that “selective” outsourcing of IT services was particularly
successful. For their selective cases reporting cost savings  a large majority (85%) of the
selective outsourcing cases that reported an outcome  savings were, on average, a
substantial 23.8% (data from Lacity and Willcocks, 1998 re-analysed in Rouse, 2002). But
the authors acknowledge in that paper that these cases are not statistically representative.
The fact that these cases are not statistically representative means they shed no light on the
success rates that might be expected in the wider population. Furthermore, researchers
often have difficulty gaining access to case study sites involving problems or failure. So the
positive odds of success represented by the cases studied by Lacity and Willcocks (1998;
2001), and the substantial cost savings reported for selective outsourcing (1998) are not

5

Rouse and Corbitt

those that typical outsourcing purchasers can expect. In spite of these limitations, the
success ratios reported by these authors were cited by a number of informants involved in
the initiative as justification for their strong belief that their selective outsourcing would
succeed.
Contemporary evidence indicates that selective, well-managed outsourcing still
involves considerable risks
In following the various recommended practices discussed above, the Australian Federal
Government was typical of the large organisations studied in the University of Melbourne
survey. Most of those respondents also followed recommended practices like selective
outsourcing; outsourcing infrastructure services; employing short contracts; benchmarking IT
services; and detailing services and service levels in their contracts. Despite this, most
survey respondents were disappointed with their IT outsourcing experiences, with only just
over 1/3 (36%) reporting a positive score on a measure of satisfaction and value. Less than
a third of respondents reported positive scores for measures of strategic benefits,
technology benefits, and economies of scale. When it came to cost savings, only 7.4% of
respondents reported substantial savings, and only 42.1% reported any savings at all.
One explanation for the problems experienced by the first four agencies in the Federal
initiative is that IT outsourcing  even selective outsourcing involving short contracts and
infrastructure services  is much riskier than has been recognised. The fact that previous
research did not quantify levels of risks appears to have led to unrealistic expectations and
over-optimism. Much of the research on risks has been based on case studies (e.g. Lacity
and Hirschheim, 1993) or subjective-argumentative research (e.g. Earl, 1996). It may be that
decision-makers discounted the risks described by researchers in the belief that they were
rare, or only encountered by poorly managed organisations.
That risks are substantial is evident in the responses to the University of Melbourne study.
Analysis revealed that risks ranged from high to very high for both public and private sector
organisations in that survey (Rouse, 2002). Negative outcomes like failing to get expected
cost savings; inability to concentrate on core business, failure to avoid technology
obsolescence, and inability to control costs were reported by the majority of organisations,
while substantial problems (like unexpected cost increases, loss of organisational
knowledge, and difficulties projecting future requirements) were encountered by many. The
proposition that these risks were not expected is consistent with the low level of satisfaction
expressed by respondents, as low satisfaction is usually the consequence when positive
expectations are not confirmed by actual experiences (c.f. Rouse, 2002).
In light of this contextual information, the negative experiences reported in the reviews
conducted by the Auditor-General and by Humphry no longer appear to be examples of
flawed management failing to achieve what other, better managed organisations were
achieving. Instead they are relatively typical of the experiences of Australia’s top private and
public organisations

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Attributions of the causes of outsourcing failure need to be examined carefully
The Humphry Report recommended the abandonment of compulsory centralised and
clustered IT outsourcing for future arrangements, because of the potential negative impacts
this approach had on operational goals. But Humphry did not go so far as to suggest that IT
outsourcing itself was inherently problematic, or that achieving significant cost savings was
unlikely. The fact that the Auditor-General had found that two of the first three arrangements
would never achieve substantial savings was not acknowledged. Instead, Humphry cited the
substantial savings observed for Cluster 3 by the Auditor-General as evidence that
outsourcing can be an economic success. Paradoxically, Humphry also recommended
abandonment of the clustering strategy that contributed to these savings.
The tenor of Humphry’s Report suggests he strongly believed that well-managed
outsourcing usually succeeds. He argues (2001:24) that “the debate over cost savings has
tended to obscure other benefits, which can arise from properly implemented outsourcing
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[emphasis added] such as wider access to technology and technical skills, strategic
partnership in a dynamic technical environment and an opportunity to manage capital
expenditures more effectively”. This belief would have influenced him to seek evidence of
poor management as a cause of the failure to meet expectations, as would the political
pragmatics of such an Inquiry.
Humphry did indeed suggest that the initiative had been compromised by poor management
on the part of the central management agency (OGIT, later renamed “OASITO”). Humphry
reported that decision-makers (within OASITO) had concentrated on contractual rather than
operational issues, and had failed to ensure co-operation from line management. In addition,
he suggested that agency management had been resistant and obstructive: “It is widely
accepted that agencies’ inertia and resistance to change contributed significantly to the
delays (2001:9)... There is a need for [an] agency’s executive and its senior managers to
demonstrate support for the process and commitment to its success (2001:14).
These explanations are not refutable, and so are not helpful. If decision-makers in OASITO
had not concentrated on legal and contractual issues, they would have been rightly
criticised. And how could decision-makers know “how much” attention to implementation risk
was sufficient? Furthermore, any problematic strategy (where key expectations are not
being met) is likely to result in resistance from some line managers, particularly if the
strategy hampers their operational goals (the situation described by both the AuditorGeneral and Humphry). Hence the evidence of poor management and line management
opposition becomes self-referential: because the initiative failed, decision makers must have
failed to gain “sufficient” co-operation of stakeholders and must not have devoted “enough”
attention to operational issues. And if line managers expressed concerns about the initiative,
this “lack of buy in” (2001:11) must have contributed to the failure to achieve the original
goals. Yet when these propositions are examined, causal links are not strongly supported.
Another factor implicated by Humphry was the clustering that occurred in two of the three
contracts studied by the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General too had suggested that
clustering had exacerbated difficulties encountered by agencies. Although Humphry
defended the original clustering strategy, he suggested it had outlived its usefulness and
was by 2000 no longer necessary (2001:12). Consequently, a key element of his
recommendations was the abandonment of requirements that agencies form grouped
contracts (i.e. cluster). Yet clustering had allowed small agencies to benefit from larger
agencies’ contract negotiation and management capacities, and attraction to vendors.
Significantly, the only contract of those studied by the Auditor-General that was likely to
succeed financially was Cluster 3, which chose to renew its clustered contract with CSC in
August 2002.
When this case is examined in depth, there is little evidence that it was clustering, the
implementation flaws described by Humphry, or the concerns expressed by some line
managers, that resulted in the abandonment of the initiative. Much of the evidence cited by
Humphry about risks and downsides of outsourcing had already been presented to the 1997
Senate Inquiry (SFPARC, 1997) but at that stage the Government had decided that the risks
were manageable. What had changed by 2000 was that the Auditor-General had revealed
that the downsides of IT outsourcing, (including the managerial attention that had to be
devoted to managing the arrangement, and the difficulties of implementing within a short
timeframe) were substantial, whether or not agencies were involved in clusters.
Furthermore, the risks that agencies would experience lock-in with the incumbent vendor at
end of the contract were much more visible, as a result of the failure to attract more than one
bidder to the fourth contract (DEETYA-EN). At the same time, the likelihood of
commensurate financial and industry development benefits was much lower than had been
expected. Consequently the risk/return ratio of the initiative was by then demonstrably, and
publicly, poor.
When the same arguments about risks and problems were presented to Humphry in 2000,
together with evidence that impact of these risks were indeed widespread and damaging, he
determined that these risks were by then so significant that the initiative should be
reconfigured. Given the damaging findings of the Auditor-General’s Report, it is unlikely that
he had any other choices open to him.
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It is tempting to see difficulties reported to Humphry as peculiar to the particular form of
implementation (e.g. use of a prime-contractor model, clustering, or exercise of seniormanagement fiat), or the result of poor management. However, the difficulties can also be
seen as examples of an important, and largely inherent, trade-off first identified by Lacity and
Hirschheim (1995): certain strategies (like requiring the line to adopt common standards and
to consolidate their IT requirements) whether implemented by vendors or internally, can lead
to moderate cost savings, but these are often at the expense of the line’s operational goals.
As an earlier supporter of outsourcing, it is unlikely that Humphry would have attributed the
failure of the arrangement to an inherent trade-off between cost savings goals and
operational needs, or to generally high risks that outsourcing benefits will fail to materialise
(as revealed by Rouse’s 2002 analysis of the University of Melbourne survey). Humphry had
been one of the industry specialists on the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee that encouraged
the Government’s adoption of IT outsourcing and the clustering approach (Humphry,
2001:22). A reading of his report suggests a strong commitment to the intrinsic value of IT
outsourcing, and its capacity to produce demonstrable benefits if well-managed. Humphry’s
commitment to the potential benefits of outsourcing is understandable given the advice and
research presented to Government at that time the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee made
its recommendations (1997)
The fact that the initiative failed to achieve goals that, in hindsight, appear very unlikely to
have been achieved puts the case in a different light. So does the evidence (from the
University of Melbourne survey) that many other organisations were also failing to achieve
similar goals. This suggests that Humphry’s attributions, and his targeting of resistant line
managers and a less-than-competent OASITO (which was consequently disbanded) could
represent a search for scapegoats for the failure of a policy that was far riskier than was, at
the time, recognised.
Some organisations will never discover that their cost expectations are not being met
Hodge (1996) observed that the more rigorous the evaluation studies of outsourcing, the
lower the reported savings. This is because more rigorous studies included costs ignored by
less rigorous ones, and controlled for other critical factors. An issue canvassed in Walker
and Walker (2000) is the quality of cost and savings projections used to justify Government
sourcing decisions. Yet when data is gathered by researchers, where do informants obtain
their figures when asked what savings (or dis-savings) they have made from a sourcing
decision? As the Auditor-General’s Review reveals, to answer the question of what savings
were actually obtained is complex, expensive, and requires substantial expertise. Rolf
Jester, a Gartner spokesman, has suggested (in The Australian, 23 Jan 2001), that after as
little as 12 months it is not even possible to establish with any certainty what the savings
were, an observation also made by the Auditor-General.
The process of determining savings requires comparison of four imprecise projections, each
involving measurement errors and technical and financial assumptions. These four
projections include:
•

Projections made at the time vendors tender about the service bundle that would
be needed over the life of the contract;

•

Contemporary projections of the likely costs of supplying these services using inhouse resources:

•

Contemporary projections of the chosen vendor’s likely costs to supply these
services and the difference between this and those projected for in-house
delivery;

•

Retrospective projections of what the services actually supplied by the vendor
(which may be different to those projected at time of contract) might have cost if
supplied in-house.
Even the calculation of the actual costs and services provided under the outsourcing
arrangements involve some imprecision. As the case study has illustrated, this calculation
too can depend on assumptions and interpretation of both the contract and accounting
conventions.
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The Auditor-General’s analysis revealed that there was a substantial difference between the
services projected at the time the contract was signed, and those actually needed by Cluster
3 over the first 12 months, as well as differences between projected and actual service
volumes. These were not the result of ignorance or failure to attend to the issues, but rather
a result of unexpected business initiatives (ANAO, 2000:196). As Lacity and Hirschheim
(1993) revealed, such differences can rapidly consume projected savings. There were also
substantial differences between the costs expected for these services, and the actual costs,
as a result of different assumptions about how staff would respond to voluntary retrenchment
offers; how contractual terms would be interpreted, how quickly certain technology upgrades
would occur; as well as some minor errors in the complex financial models used to evaluate
tenders (ANAO, 2000:196-197). This is an important lesson for decision-makers, as many
organisations could be expected to encounter similar situations.
Cluster 3 was the only agency in a position to even attempt the various comparisons
discussed above. The clustered Group 5 argued that to carry out this analysis would be
prohibitively time consuming and difficult, and might lead to distortions because of the high
level of error involved. ATO was too early into its contract to measure savings at the time the
Attorney-General reported. It is likely that similar circumstances will prevent most other IT
outsourcers from conducting post-implementation reviews of actual cost savings achieved.
This means that reported “savings” will often be based upon a very optimistic expectation,
and that conflicting information may never be formally gathered to challenge the initial
expectation.
This is a particular problem for IT outsourcing researchers, because unless purchaser
organisations have in fact carried out a comprehensive post-outsourcing review, many
“savings” figures reported to researchers are likely to be those projected at the time the
contract is signed, and so to significantly over-state actual savings
The Auditor-General’s analysis of the Group 5 and ATO business cases revealed further,
much greater error margins in projected costs associated with failure on the part of the
decision makers to spot flaws in the assumptions that underlay projections made largely by
specialist consultants. According to the Auditor-General these flaws meant that projected
savings of 10% (Group 5) and 18% (ATO) would result in probable cost increases, or, at
best, savings of 5.4% (ANAO, 2000:167) though these savings would quickly be eaten up by
management costs and by unexpected changes. Analytic flaws like these are not likely to be
revealed even when post implementation reviews are carried out, unless reviews are
performed by staff with specialist financial skills, such as those held in the office of the
Auditor-General.
Without the Auditor-General’s independent (and to some extent, unwelcome) public review,
Government decision makers might not have discovered that their expectations were not
being met for some years, if at all. But this situation is likely to apply to many other
organisations involved in IT outsourcing. Detailed analysis, like that conducted by the
Auditor-General, may well reveal that savings are eaten up by the same factors that were at
play with the initiative: changes in business requirements and volumes, misunderstandings
about what is meant by complex contractual terms, delays associated with evolving
technologies, incorrect assumptions, and in complex business cases, possibly errors.
IT outsourcing is expected to lead to multiple outcomes, some of which are
antagonistic
An examination of trade and consulting literature in the last few years reveals a new theme:
only naive decision-makers expect to make substantial savings from IT outsourcing: instead,
sophisticated managers are seeking strategic benefits, like access to new skills and
technologies and concentration on core competencies. This theme can be discerned by
examining sites like the vendor-dominated Outsourcing Institute, or those of consultants
advising on outsourcing.
A cynic might be tempted to see this as a response to the failure over a decade to
demonstrate widespread substantial savings from IT outsourcing. However, another
possible interpretation is related to the findings of the Federal initiative. This is that IT
outsourcing is usually initiated to achieve multiple goals, some of which may need to be
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traded off. The Federal government was seeking cost savings, better, or at least no worse
impact on operational business; and industry development. The evidence from the various
documents consulted was that they could achieve some of these goals, but not all. The
ATO, for example, has reported substantial technology improvements as a result of its
outsourcing arrangement, but reports of substantial savings are noticeable by their absence.
According to the Auditor-General, these were always unlikely. Humphry reported a number
of negative consequences of agencies’ attempts to meet industry development goals (which
were later downgraded as a result of the Humphry Review), and noted that these goals
conflicted with agency’s operational goals (2001: 36). Elsewhere Lacity and Willcocks (2001)
reported that the South Australian Government achieved substantial industry development,
but evidence for substantial cost savings from that arrangement is slim. Rouse’s (2002) reanalysis of the University of Melbourne survey revealed that while the majority of purchasers
reported obtaining new skills and positive vendor service from their outsourcing
arrangements, this was at the expense of economic benefits (including cost savings);
technology benefits, and strategic benefits.
The noted economist Shlomo Maital (1994) has observed that only inefficient organisations
can achieve organisational improvements without trading off different goals. The Federal
Government had been led by advice to expect that they would not encounter unacceptable
trade offs when outsourcing IT, but they were unpleasantly surprised. When cost savings
were achieved, the operational impacts were quite negative, while arrangements (like,
reportedly, the ATO) that succeeded in meeting technology and business goals did so at the
expense of substantial savings. The “solution” now in place as a result of the Humphry
Review (that is, requiring individual agencies to market test their service requirements) may
not end up solving the problems revealed by the Auditor-General’s and Humphry Reports.
Reducing complex, rich observations to simplified “recommended practices” has
some limitations
The failure of an organisation that went to such trouble to manage its risks raises questions
about the “operationalisation” of the recommended practices OASITO followed. These
practices were drawn largely from the case studies carried out by Lacity and Hirschheim in
the early 90s, and the post-hoc cross-case analyses done when Lacity and Willcocks began
reviewing their combined research (c.f. Lacity et al., 1996; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998).
Examination of the original case descriptions (for example those in Lacity and Hirschheim,
1993) reveal complexity and richness, yet this richness was eventually distilled (Lacity et al.,
1996) into a number of relatively simple prescriptions that may not have captured the
underlying causal factors.
One example is “selective outsourcing”, which has frequently been described as leading to
success (Lacity et al. 1996; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; 2001). Statistical analysis of the
University of Melbourne survey had failed to find any differences in success measures
between “selective” and “total” outsourcers (Rouse, 2002). In seeking an explanation for
this, it became clear that the definition of “selective” outsourcing is malleable. While the label
was originally used to describe outsourcing between 20% and 80% of IT budget (Lacity et
al., 1996); more recently (2001) it has been used by the authors to describe outsourcing as
low as 10% of IT budget. Informants in the focus groups conducted by Rouse (2002) tended
to define “selective” outsourcing in terms of what it was not, that is “total” outsourcing. Total
outsourcing has been presented in the academic literature as a risky and discredited
strategy. Yet, as both Lacity and Willcocks (2000) and the University of Melbourne study
identified that only around 7% of organisations engage in “total” outsourcing, there are very
few decision-makers who would not perceive themselves as being involved in the
recommended “selective” outsourcing.
As another example, the recommended practice “involve line management and IT
management in the decision” came about because some of the problematic cases studied
by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) excluded one or other of these groups from the decision. In
the Federal initiative, the Government did involve both line management and IT in their
decisions. There was extensive consultation and discussion amongst OASITO and line and
IT staff in all the agencies involved. Not all agreed with the decision, but stakeholders had
many opportunities to express their reservations through this consultation, and through the
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Senate Inquiry that took place during 1997. When seeking to reconcile this observation it
becomes apparent that the term “involvement” is very general It does not, for example,
necessarily imply that active support from all parties is required for success. There are many
examples in the IS and management literatures of senior management instituting ultimately
successful organisational programs that encountered disagreements and dissent.
Furthermore, such simplicity is not apparent in Lacity and Hirschheim’s original discussion of
this practice which was concerned with the problems of excluding one or other viewpoint.
Again, the impact of this imprecision is that it is likely to be only in those (probably rare)
organisations that actively exclude one or other group that decision-makers would not
perceive themselves as involving both IT and line management.
It is likely that many of the recommended practices are necessary, but not sufficient for
achieving success, particularly as the probability of their not being followed at all is low. For
example, it is unlikely that an organisation involved in a multi-million dollar venture would not
establish post management structures and processes of some kind, yet the Federal initiative
has illustrated that such processes, even when based on “international best practice” advice
do not guarantee success. A similar observation can be made about careful market testing
and crafting of detailed contracts. The conclusion that such practices are not sufficient to
guarantee success implies that decision makers may be unwittingly led to under-estimate
their own risks when outsourcing IT, because most would be able to reassure themselves
that they were following recommended risk-minimising practices.
It is significant that there has been virtually no evidence provided about how well such
practices protect against failure. The bulk of research conducted to date is either case study
based, or subjective-argumentative, and so is not able to provide probabilistic estimates of
success and risks, or the moderating effects that recommended management practices
have on these. Quantitative studies have generally been small, so that the observed
relationships could easily have occurred purely by chance. So although there is convincing
qualitative evidence that failing to follow these practices can lead to problems, decision
makers have no information about what risks they run even when such management
practices are followed.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a very different view of the Federal IT Infrastructure case than has
been presented in the press and some academic literature. In light of the contemporary
survey data, it is our view that the case study is not an example of poor decisions and
implementation. Instead it illustrates a decision predicated on research and advice that was
overoptimistic about likely benefits if IT outsourcing, and unrealistically confident that good
management could overcome the associated risks. Many of the outcomes for this “fiasco”
are in fact typical of those of contemporary Australian organisations, and probably of many
large organisations.
A key implication of the case is that decision-makers need to frame their decisions in light of
recent research about the relative risks and returns from IT outsourcing. The case reveals
considerable uncertainty surrounding likely outcomes, and highlights the possibility that key
assumptions about costs, savings, managerial effort, or the effects of outsourcing on
operational performance might be incorrect. Framing IT outsourcing as a quite risky venture
(in contrast to the comfortable and reassuring message provided by many vendors and
consultants) demands similar strategies to those undertaken when examining any potentially
risky venture. Such framing suggests careful examination of assumptions, recognition of the
high levels of uncertainty involved in estimates, sensitivity analysis, “risk-boxing” of initial
forays, and, as was done by the Auditor-General, early, and ideally, independent, evaluation
of the achievement of goals set for the venture.
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